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REPUBLICANISM
AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW
RICHARD DAGGER*

ESTABLISHING the philosophical foundations of criminal law is less a matter of exca-

vation than of reconstruction. Neither criminal law nor law in general is the product
of an architect's design, which careful digging in the right places will reveal, but
something that has emerged, evolved, and developed over the centuries. Codifiers
and constitution drafters have played parts in this development, to be sure, but their
efforts have had less to do with excavation than with the reconstruction of the criminal law. That is, their aim typically has been to clarify the form and improve the substance of the law as it has come down to them in order to approximate more closely
the law as they think it ought to be. To carry out these tasks, however, the codifiers
and drafters must have some sense of what law can and ought to be-some theory,
however implicit and inarticulate it may be, of the law. To articulate such a theory is
to provide a rational reconstruction of the law.
Rational reconstruction thus aims to discover the reason or logic inherent in
the law despite its irregular development over time and the various courses it takes
* I am grateful to Jeffrie Murphy, Alice Ristroph, Mary Sigler, and the editors for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

REPUBLICANISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW

45

from one place to another. In the case of criminal law, rational reconstruction must
account for the leading features of criminal law and point the way to its reform or
further development. Such a reconstruction, in other words, should lead to a theory
that will have, in Antony Duff's terms, both an analytical and a normative dimension. The theory must not only account, analytically, for the typical operations and
aspects of criminal law but also take a position, in its normative dimension, on 'what
it [criminal law] ought to be (and whether it ought to be at all)'. 1
My purpose in this chapter is to make a case for the republican tradition in political philosophy as a theory that can provide this rational reconstruction of criminal
law. I claim no originality in this regard, as others have found the underpinnings of
criminal law and law more generally in republicanism. John Braithwaite and Philip
Pettit advance 'a republican theory of criminal justice' in their Not Just Deserts, for
instance, and Antony Duff suggests that republicanism provides a basis for criminal
law in his recent writings. 2 I shall argue, like Duff, not that republicanism is superior
to every possible competing theory, but that it offers a reconstruction of criminal law
that is both rational and plausible. In particular, I shall try to show that republicanism can help us to make sense of three important features of criminal law: first, the
conviction that crime is a public wrong; second, the general pattern of development
of criminal law historically; and third, the public nature of criminal law as a cooperative enterprise. To begin, however, I must explain what I take republicanism to be
and why it is a proper place to look for a rational reconstruction of criminal law.

1 REPUBLICANISM, BRIEFLY CONSIDERED
Whether one thinks the republican tradition a likely place to look for a rational
reconstruction of criminal law will depend in large part on how one conceives of the
relationship between political and legal philosophy. A quarter ofa century ago Jeffrie
Murphy complained that philosophers oflaw often forget 'that the philosophy oflaw
is a part of social and political philosophy and not merely of moral philosophy ...
[I]n addition to considering the intrinsic moral merits and demerits ofa legal practice,
1

RA Duff, 'Theories of Criminal Law', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (<http://plato.stanford.edu>; posted 14 October 2002), §1. See also M Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) on why 'descriptive theories of an area of law are also evaluative
theories', 15-18, at 18.
2
J Braithwaite and P Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990); RA Duff, 'Toward a Theory of Criminal Law?' (2010) 84 Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supp Vol, 1-17, and Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the
Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 49-53.
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such as punishment, philosophers oflaw must also see such practices in terms of the
general problems of social and political philosophy-particularly the problems of
the nature and justification of the state and its coercive power'.3 Murphy is right, in
my view, and emphatically so where criminal law is concerned. The determination
of what counts as a crime, the prevention of crimes, the proper treatment of those
charged with crimes, the conviction and subsequent treatment of criminals-all
these are matters typically entrusted to political authorities. One might argue that
no one should entrust these powers to political authorities, or that no one is truly
justified in claiming political authority, but to advance such arguments is in itself to
engage in political philosophy.
The republican tradition's place in political philosophy should not disqualify it,
then, from consideration as a theory of criminal law. But what is republicanism?
As I see it, the fundamental elements of republicanism, today as in classical Greece
and Rome, are publicity and self-government.4 That is, republicans believe that
government is a public concern-the res publica-rather than the personal business or property of some ruler or ruling class; and public concerns are the province
of self-governing citizens who will seek to enjoy liberty under and through the law.
Understood in this way, republicanism is not sharply different from some other
traditions of political thought, including the liberalism to which Murphy and
many other philosophers oflaw claim adherence. John Locke, John Stuart Mill,
and other exemplars of liberalism maintain that government is a public concern
and citizens should enjoy liberty under law, just as republicans do. There is, however, a difference of emphasis, best captured in the republican claim that liberty
is not so much a matter of freedom from the law as of freedom by or through the
law.5 To put the point another way-and to do so while allowing for the possibility
of a liberal republicanism or republican liberalism-we may say that liberals tend
to worry about protecting the privacy of individuals from unwarranted intrusion,

3

J Murphy, 'Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State' (1985) 4 Criminal Justice Ethics,
3-11, at 4. For a general consideration of the connection between the philosophy oflaw and political
philosophy by an author who deplores 'the artificial boundary' between the two, see J Waldron, 'Legal
and Political Philosophy', in J Coleman and S Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence
and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 352-81, at 381. For a contrary view,
at least with regard to the philosophy of punishment, see M Davis, 'The Relative Independence of
Punishment Theory', in Davis, To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime: Essays in the Theory ofCriminal
Justice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 18-41.
4
The remainder of this section draws on my 'Republicanism and Crime', in S Besson and JL Marti,
Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009), 148-50. For a somewhat fuller sketch, see my 'Republicanism', in G Klosko (ed), The Oxford
Handbook ofthe History ofPolitical Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
5
Philip Pettit is fond of quoting in this regard the i7th-century republican James Harrington's
disparagement of Thomas Hobbes's conception of!iberty, which Harrington took to be an untenable
'liberty or immunity from the laws'; see, eg, J Braithwaite and P Pettit, Not Just Deserts, 59 (emphasis
in original).
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while republicans worry more about the need to promote active and responsible
citizenship.
That republicans are committed to the importance of publicity and selfgovernment has been evident since at least the first century BCE, when Cicero set
down his definition of the republic. The 'commonwealth [res publica]', he wrote, 'is
the concern of a people, but a people is not any group of men assembled in any way,
but an assemblage of some size associated with one another through agreement on
law and community of interest'.6 According to another classical definition, a republic is the empire oflaws, not of men. Both of these definitions focus on the rule oflaw
because law limits the rulers' ability to impose their will or whims on their subjects;
when everyone is subject to the law, no one is subject to the arbitrary, unchecked
power of another. As an empire oflaws, the republic protects the public interest and
promotes the liberty of its citizens, who will be free to govern themselves because
they are free from the grip of those who would dominate them.
In terms recently made familiar by Philip Pettit, the rule of law helps to secure
people from both imperium and dominium. 7 Security from imperium-that is, arbitrary power in the hands of those who control the state or government-has been
the principal concern of republican theorists through the centuries, but Pettit is
surely right to point out the need for security also from dominium-that is, arbitrary power in the hands of private individuals. This double security also connects
with the republican emphasis on the common interest or public good. Exactly what
constitutes the common interest or public good is a point on which republicans will
often disagree among themselves. They agree, however, that a political society is a
shared or common enterprise that must proceed according to rules, as Cicero's definition indicates. One aspect of the public good, then, will be the need to protect and
preserve these rules and the bonds that hold the members of this enterprise together.
Another aspect is the need to respect citizens not only as public persons but also as
individuals with personal interests. As Mortimer Sellers says: 'Republicanism is the
theory that law and government exist to serve the public good, including the public
interest in protecting private interests against each other, but also against the state.' 8
Protecting private interests against one another is thus a way of securing liberty from
dominium. It is also the point at which crime becomes relevant to republicanism.
To be sure, crime is not the only way in which one person may exercise arbitrary
power over another. There is imperium, of course, and one virtue of the criminal
law is that its provisions for procedural justice help to protect citizens from various kinds of unwarranted coercion by those holding political office. There are also
6
Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws J Zetzel (ed) (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 18.
7
P Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory ofFreedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997), esp 112 and 130.
8
MNS Sellers, Republican Legal Theory: The History, Constitution and Purposes of Law in a Free
State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 72 (emphasis added).
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forms of dominium that may be quite lawful-the husband who browbeats his wife,
for example, or the landowner who bends her tenants to her will. Other forms of
dominium, such as defamation of character, may be matters for tort rather than
criminal law.9 Yet crime is surely one of the most common and persistent ways in
which some people wield arbitrary power over others. Like the unchecked ruler, the
criminal interferes with our ability to govern our own lives. By stealing my property
or robbing me of the use of an eye or arm, the criminal also leaves me less free to go
about my life-less free not only because of the loss of the property, eye, or arm, but
also because of the fear and insecurity I now feel. 10 Nor do I need to be the direct
victim for crime to make me less free by being less secure or feeling more vulnerable.
The fact that others in my vicinity have become victims could be enough to raise my
insurance rates, send me to the locksmith or private protection agency, and change
the routes I take as I go about my business.
Crime, in short, is a threat to a republic insofar as it threatens the rule oflaw and
interferes with the ability to be self-governing. To say this, of course, is to presume
that murder, rape, robbery, and the other offences we commonly call crimes are not
really torts-private wrongs inflicted by some individuals upon other individuals,
to be settled by lawsuit in civil court. But that is exactly what republicans do presume. As they see it, the standard criminal offences are not matters to be settled by
private agreement or arbitration but wrongs deserving of public condemnation and
punishment. Crime certainly harms and threatens the persons and property of private individuals, but it also tears at the sentiments that make a sense of common life,
under law, possible. Crime is a fitting subject for republican concern, then, because
dealing with crime is an important part of the public's business. For that reason, the
public should play a part in passing laws that define what crimes are, that provide
for agencies to protect its members from crime, and that establish just procedures
for treating those accused of committing crimes, including the proper treatment of
those found guilty.
Crime is also a very real threat from the republican point of view. Republicans
share a persistent worry about the likelihood of corruption, and corruption breeds,
among other things, crime. Ambition, avarice, the desire for luxury and ease-these
and other temptations to criminal and other kinds of vicious conduct may be held in
check or redirected, but republicans see no reason to believe they can be eradicated.
Republicans celebrate civic virtue, but they do so largely because they know that
such virtue is not to be taken for granted. Putting the public good ahead of one's
private interests is a virtue that republicans believe most people can achieve, but they
9

I venture a republican explanation for classifying defamation as a tort rather than a crime in
'Republicanism and Crime', in S Besson and JL Marti, Legal Republicanism: National and International
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 162-5.
0
'
On this point, see GP Fletcher, 'Domination in Wrongdoing' (1996) 76 Boston University Law
Review 347-60, at 347. But cf FM Lawrence, 'Comment: The Limits of Domination' (1996) 76 Boston
University Law Review 361-70.

REPUBLICANISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW

49

also fear that most people can as easily put their private interests ahead of the public good-and ahead of the personal interests of others. For republicans, therefore,
finding ways to deal with crime is definitely part of the public's business. But can
republicanism help with the problem of defining crime?

2 CRIME AS THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS
Jaded lawyers and legal theorists sometimes say that the definition of'crime' is simply a matter oflegislative action-that is, what makes something criminal is that the
relevant legislature declares it to be so. There is, of course, more than a grain of truth
to this way of defining 'crime', but there are also reasons to find it unsatisfactory.
The problem, as one influential commentator complains, is that this definition 'is
simple, circular, and largely useless'.11 In particular, it is of no use to the legislators
who must decide whether to declare certain acts or activities criminal, for they will
find no guidance in the statement that a crime is whatever they collectively say it is.
What legislators want to know is how they should vote, not what the outcome will be
when all of their votes are counted. Like the people they represent, in other words,
legislators need to have some sense of independent standards for regarding some
acts as criminal and others as not. Who would conclude, for example, that murder
is not really a crime, but brushing one's teeth more than twice a week is, simply
because a legislature passes laws to make the former legal and the latter criminal?
The standards will seldom be as clear and uncontroversial as they are in these farfetched examples, but the conviction that such standards are to be found-and that
there is something more to the definition and determination of crime than legislative fiat-is widespread and deeply rooted. Why else would apparently intelligent
and reasonable people think it worthwhile to draft and revise such documents as the
Model Penal Code? Presumably they believe they have found independent standards, or criteria embedded in the law as it has come down to them, that make some
acts and activities fit candidates for the designation 'crime' and others not.
Unsatisfactory as it is, however, there remains an important truth in this 'simple, circular, and largely useless' definition of crime, for it points to the connection
between public action and the criminal law. When a legislature declares certain acts
11

J Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (4th edn; Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2006), 1. But cfHL
Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), 18-19:
'the definition of crime is inescapably tautological. Crime is whatever is formally and authoritatively
described as criminal... [C]rime is conduct capable of incurring consequences formally termed
criminal.'
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or activities to be criminal, it takes a public stance by means of political action; or
when a judge or jury declares an act or activity to be an instance of a common-law
crime, the judge or jury issues a public pronouncement. We may not always approve
of these legislative or judicial stances on these matters-we may even protest, paradoxically, that these decisions make a crime of something that in its essence is not,
and surely ought not to be, a crime-but the point is that the decisions have, ceteris
paribus, the force oflaw. Crimes are not only wrongs but public wrongs, and 'public'
in the twofold sense that they both require the attention of the law and are different
from the private wrongs, such as torts and breaches of contract, to which the law also
must attend. That is why it is the proper business oflegislatures and courts to decide
what is to be deemed a public wrong-a crime.
Etymology is not especially illuminating in the case of 'crime', but it does tell us
something about the nature ofcrime as public wrong. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, 'crime' derives, by way of Old French, from the Latin crimen, meaning
'judgement, accusation, offence'; or, as the Oxford Latin Dictionary defines crimen,
'An indictment, charge, accusation'. In The Data ofJurisprudence, William Galbraith
Miller also suggests a connection between crimen and the Greek Kpivw, which Liddell
and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon translates as 'decision, judgement';' decree, resolution'; 'legal decision'; 'matter for judgment, question'; 'law-suit'; 'judging, judgment'.12
What is most striking about these definitions, from the modern perspective, is that
the forebears of the English 'crime' apparently referred to an accusation brought or
a judgment rendered against someone, and not, as we would expect, to the wrongful
act that the accused or judged supposedly committed. How this shift occurred is not
clear, but Miller's conclusion seems apt: 'The mere trial, the accusation, the very suspicion is a stigma-crimen, a charge, becomes crimen, a crime.'13 Such a conclusion is
consistent, at least, with the Oxford Latin Dictionary's fourth definition of crimen as,
with references to Ovid and Seneca, a 'misdeed, crime'.
Less striking, but more important for present purposes, is the way that the Latin
and Greek ancestors of'crime' invoke public activity. To bring an indictment or an
accusation against someone is to call him to account; to seek a judgment against
that person, or to pass judgment on him, presupposes that at least one other person
is in the position of judging. Something official or public takes place, in short. The
office in question may be only loosely defined, and in the ancient world it would have
been concerned as much with what we now think of as religion, morality, and custom as with politics or law. Nevertheless, calling to account and passing judgment
were, and are, actions that involve more than the putative offender and victim, as the
aggrieved party must appeal to some standard-and typically to some third party in
at least a quasi-official position-for a judgment against the accused. In this sense,
12

WG Miller, The Data ofJurisprudence (Littleton, CO, 1980 [1903]), 193. Henry Liddell and Robert
Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, vol I (rev edn; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948).
" Ibid 193-4.
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crimen was, as crime continues to be, concerned with wrongs that were not simply
private or personal matters. What etymology suggests, in sum, is that the concept of
crime emerged not from an attempt to identify wrong or wrongful conduct as such
but from attempts to provide a public, formal response to certain kinds of activities
already identified as wrong. Extending Miller's comment, it seems that 'crimen, a
charge, becomes crimen, a crime', because the public charges brought against certain wrongdoers led eventually to the conclusion that their activities were wrongs
for which one would face a public charge and judgment.
But what have these considerations to do with republicanism? The answer is to be
found not in etymology but in the rational reconstruction of which I wrote earlier.
'Crime' and 'republic' both relate to matters of public concern-implicitly in the
former case, as we have seen, but explicitly in the case of res publica. The classical
republican thinkers-including at least one, Cicero, who had considerable experience of criminal law-thought that the public business encompassed far more than
accusing and passing judgment, but they certainly included these actions among the
proper concerns of republican citizens and officials. More generally, they conceived
of the republic as a common enterprise, under law, in which citizens were to enjoy
freedom through self-government. If the republic truly was to be an empire oflaws
rather than of men, as we have seen, then it was necessary to identify those wrongs
that threaten the public enterprise and to pass judgment on those who commit them.
Defining crime, then, is as important to the public's business as the apprehension,
conviction, and punishment of criminals.
This conclusion may seem to be neither surprising nor compelling. Apart from
the anarchists, one might ask, who does not take crime to be an important part of the
public's business? Even monarchies and other non-republican regimes have systems
of criminal law in which acts and activities called 'crimes' are defined, condemned,
and punished as public wrongs. Why, then, should we look to republicanism for a
rational reconstruction of criminal law?
The republican response to this challenge has two aspects. The first consists in
pointing out that monarchies, juntas, and authoritarian regimes of various sorts can
only have systems of criminal law insofar as they rely, albeit implicitly and perhaps
parasitically, on the republican ideal of the empire of laws. If King Rex, to borrow
Lon Fuller's famous example, is to rule through law rather than whim or sheer will,
there are certain things he must and must not do-make his pronouncements public,
for example, and not command his subjects to do what they cannot possibly do.14 In
other words, laws must at least carry the appearance of satisfying Thomas Aquinas'
definition oflaw as an 'order of reason for the common good by one who has the care
of the community, and promulgated'.15 The more difficult it becomes to see even the
14

L Fuller, The Morality ofLaw (rev edn; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 33-8.
T Aquinas, On Law, Morality, and Politics, trans RJ Regan (2nd edn; Indianapolis, IN: Hackett,
2002), 15 (Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 90, Art4).
15
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appearance of reason, authority, promulgation, or a concern for the common good
in the ruler or rulers' pronouncements, the less likely it is that those subject to these
pronouncements will believe themselves to be subject to the rule oflaw. 16
The second aspect of the republican response is simply to proceed to develop
a republican reconstruction of criminal law in the expectation that its value thus
will become clear. For example, the republican might try to show that a theory of
criminal law grounded in the desire to be free from imperium and dominium is not
merely plausible but powerfully illuminating, both analytically and normatively.
That, indeed, is what Pettit has tried to do.17 I shall proceed in a different way here,
however, by looking more directly to the reconstruction of the foundations of criminal law. In doing so, I shall make use of the familiar idea of the state of nature.

3 THE STATE OF NATURE, THE 'SELF-HELP'
MODEL, AND LAW'S POTENTIAL
Republican thinkers typically have not resorted to state-of-nature or social-contract
arguments. In general they have begun, like Aristotle, by conceiving of men and
(more recently) women as political or social beings, which leaves little reason to
investigate a supposedly natural condition in which law and government do not
exist. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is an exception to this rule, however, and I believe that
we can learn something from his example. 18 But I also take it that appeals to the state
of nature and the social contract can illuminate important aspects of political and
legal philosophy even when they are not presented as historically accurate accounts
of how political and legal authority came to be-or adequate justifications, for that
matter, for claims to such authority.19
Rousseau conceives of the state of nature in his Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality (1755) less in the 'what if' fashion of Thomas Hobbes than in a 'how it must
16

I return to this point in section 4 below, with reference to HLA Hart's 'internal aspect' oflaw.
J Braithwaite and P Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990); also, inter alia, P Pettit, 'Republican Theory and Criminal Punishment' (1997)
9 Utilitas 59-79.
18
For an explication of the republican (or republican.liberal) aspects of Rousseau's political
thought, see ch 6 of my Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997).
19
For a recent example of the illuminating use of the idea of the social contract, see BC Zipursky,
'Philosophy of Private Law', in J Coleman and S Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook ofJurisprudence
and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), esp §4, 'A Contractarian Model of
Private Rights of Action in Private Law'.
17
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have been' manner. That is, Hobbes presents the state of nature as the 'solitary, poore,
nasty, brutish, and short' condition in which the men and women of his day would
find themselves were there to be-perhaps as the result of a civil war-no political or
legal authority over them. 20 Rousseau, by contrast, proceeds in an anthropological
rather than hypothetical manner, asking what the state of nature must have been
like, and how political and legal authority might have arisen out of it. For present
purposes, how Rousseau answers these questions is less important than his general approach. We need not follow him, for example, when he suggests that human
beings in the state of nature were originally little more than brute animals wandering about the fields and forests, each living a solitary existence save for the occasional
satisfaction of natural urges that led to pregnancy and childbirth. In contrast to this
view, which has social life and sentiments developing only as people slowly come to
recognize the benefits of cooperation, it seems more plausible to think that humans
have always lived in groups of some kind-families, clans, or tribes, if not societies
or polities. Nor is Rousseau's famous account of the foundation of civil society, at the
beginning of Part II of the Discourse, as persuasive as it is provocative:
The first man who, having fenced off a plot ofland, thought of saying 'This is mine' and found
people simple enough to believe him was the real founder of civil society. How many crimes,
wars, murders, how many miseries and horrors might the human race have been spared by
the one who, upon pulling up the stakes or filling in the ditch, had shouted to his fellow men,
'Beware of listening to this impostor; you are lost, if you forget that the fruits of the earth
belong to all and that the earth belongs to no one!' 21

Such an account is plausible only if one takes the existence of property relations as
the defining feature of civil society. Even then, as Aristotle and many others have
argued, there is at least as much to be said for private property as Rousseau says
against it here. Indeed, Rousseau himself endorses an essentially Lockean justification of private property in his Social Contract (Bk I, ch 9).
Why, then, should we take Rousseau's approach to the state of nature as a model
when we look for the foundations of criminal law? The answer has two parts. First,
suitably modified, Rousseau's 'how it must have been' approach provides a helpful
way to think about the gradual emergence of criminal law, and law in general, over
time. Second, it also tells us something about the potential of criminal law, and law
in general, as a force for good that is vulnerable to manipulation and ideological
distortion.
Concerning the first point, a suitably modified account of the emergence of criminal law would take something like the following form. In the original state of nature,
as it must have been, men and women lived in small groups, clinging together from
20

T Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), Book I, ch XIII.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men, in
A Ritter (ed) and J Conaway Bondanella (trans), Rousseau's Political Writings (New York: WW Norton
& Co, 1988), 34.
21
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affection and for the sake of survival. Other groups of people would have threatened
them, however, and rivalries, jealousy, and sheer selfishness occasionally must have
disturbed every group's harmony, so that it became necessary not only to join in
defensive efforts but also to find ways to deal with those who harmed or wronged
other members of the group. There were also probably some misdeeds-violations
of a deeply shared belief, perhaps-that seemed to wrong no one as an individual
but the group as a whole. In this state of nature, individuals presumably tried to set
things right by acting on their own. You hit me, so I hit you back; you maimed my
brother, so I maim you or your brother in return. In clans or groups that included
many families, the retaliation or retribution would be not so much an individual as
a familial matter; in even larger groups, it would be a clan-based matter. In this fashion, the idea of a crime as something more than an individual offence-as a public
wrong-must gradually have emerged.
Crucial to this emergence would have been the dissatisfaction with the blood
feuds and vendettas that grew out of private acts of vengeance. In some cases rough
and informal standards for meting out retribution may have served to keep the violence in check, but the obvious problem with private vengeance is that it is as likely to
incite bitterness, enmity, and further violence as it is to leave all parties feeling that
justice has been done. Whether a grievance is slight or truly significant is a matter
the parties can easily disagree about, as are the questions of whether the offence was
real or merely imagined, intended, or accidental. So too is the question of whether
a retaliatory act is in or out of proportion to the original harm or wrong. For these
reasons, private vengeance would produce unending feuds and escalating violence
as it drew more and more people into the conflict-or in some cases left the weak to
nurse their grievances as they cowered before the strong. One need not conclude that
the state of nature would thus become a catastrophic state of war-a conclusion that
Hobbes and Rousseau shared-to believe that people caught up in feuds and vendettas would eventually come to perceive the desirability of some better way to try to
set matters right. This better way would necessarily consist of some means of defining and dealing with offences too serious simply to leave to the individuals directly
involved to settle among themselves. Such is the story that Aeschylus' Oresteia trilogy tells in dramatic form, with Athena founding a sy&tem oflaws to quell the spiralling violence of blood feuds. In John Locke's terms, in place of the state of nature,
where everyone has the right to punish offenders, the rule oflaw would provide 'an
established, settled, known ... standard of right and wrong', a 'known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established
law', and an enforcement agency 'to back and support the sentence when right, and
to give it due execution'. 22 In short, one need not resort to the social contract, as
Locke did, to imagine how something like criminal law, and the rule oflaw in general, could have emerged from a state of nature as a response to these defects.
22

J Locke, 1he Second Treatise ofGovernment, §§124, 125, 126.
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I say 'something like criminal law' here because it is conceivable that the public system of dispute resolution that emerges from a state of nature will resemble a
system of civil rather than criminal law. If all that matters is finding a way to end
blood feuds and vendettas, then public arbitration may be sufficient. In fact, historical scholarship on the origins oflaw suggests that something of this sort is what
happened. According to James Q Whitman, 'our dominant model of the origins of
law and the state' is what has come to be called the 'self-help model'. 23 In Whitman's
capsule version, this model comprises:
four fundamental stages in the early development oflaw and the state. Stage one is the stage
of the state of nature. This is a stage of ordered vengeance and vendetta. In this first stage,
clans and/or individuals exact vengeance, in a systematic and rule-governed way, when
injured by other clans and/or individuals; in particular, they exact ta/ionic vengeance, seeking, in the famous biblical phrase, 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth'. In stage two, the
early state emerges. This early state does not, however, attempt to prevent violence. Rather,
it sets out to supervise the existing system of vengeance. Thus, the early state assumes a kind
oflicensing power over acts of talionic vengeance, requiring that injured parties seek formal
state sanction before avenging themselves. In stage three, the early state itselfbegins to function as an enforcer, taking vengeance on behalfofinjured clans; in [Max] Weber's phrase, the
early state of stage three monopolizes the legitimate use of violence. Only in stage four does
the early state at last move to eliminate private violence. In this fourth stage, the early state
institutes a system of'compositions', substituting money damages for talionic vengeance. 24

So described, the self-help model is consistent in its broad outlines with the
Rousseauvean account. There are important respects, however, in which the
Rousseauvean account differs from the self-help model. To begin with, the two differ with regard to the question of how orderly the 'ordered vengeance and vendetta'
of stage one, the state of nature, truly was; but I think a resolution may be found,
following Rousseau, by conceiving of the state of nature in a more dynamic fashion
than 'stage one' of the self-help model suggests. That is, the model's first stage would
have occurred later in the course of the state of nature than the beginning point of
the 'how it must have been' account. In addition, the model's first stage depicts 'clans
and/or individuals' exacting vengeance 'in a systematic and rule-governed way',
before 'the early state emerges' in stage two.25 This seems to presume some sense
of a community-of being part of a public-that underpins this system of rules for
exacting vengeance. Those who do wrong and those who suffer wrongdoing are not
completely alien to one another, in other words, but members of a public insofar
as they accept this system of rules as something that applies to all of them. In this
respect, the Rousseauvean account, with its picture of societies forming before civil
society forms, complements the self-help model.
23
JQ Whitman, 'The Origins of Law and the State: Perversion of Violence, Mutilation ofBodies, or
Setting of Prices?' (1995-96) 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review 41-84, at 41.
24
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Whether this system of rules would be likely to produce 'a stage of ordered vengeance and vendetta' in the absence of a state, as the self-help model indicates, is, however, a point at which the model and the Rousseauvean account appear to be at odds.
Indeed, there seem to be two interpretations of the self-help model in this regard.
According to one interpretation, the state emerges, in effect, when a group of entrepreneurs seizes the opportunity to take control of the already existing system of
'ordered vengeance and vendetta' in order to advance the entrepreneurs' interests.
According to the second interpretation, the state emerges in response to some defect
or deficiency in the already existing system, the most likely of which is the tendency
of the system of 'ordered vengeance and vendetta' to break down when there are no
public institutions to maintain it. This second interpretation is more in keeping with
the Rousseauvean, republican account of the emergence of criminal law, as I have
previously suggested, but there is also room, as we shall see, for elements of the first
interpretation in that account.
Despite these differences, the 'how it must have been' story of the emergence of
criminal law seems broadly consistent with the self-help model. But is the self-help
model itself altogether satisfactory? Whitman and others maintain that it is not. 26
The key word here, though, is 'altogether'. The critics agree that the model is sound
in important respects, and those respects seem to be those most salient to the 'how
it must have been' account of the emergence oflaw and legal authority. As Whitman
acknowledges: 'Some sort of vengeance or vendetta system must lie somewhere
in the background of our earliest sources; the evidence for the partial truth of the
model is too powerful to be thrown out.' 27 But there is also another aspect of the
self-help model that is problematic, at least from the standpoint of a rational reconstruction of criminal law. According to Whitman's description, the early state moves
'to eliminate private violence' in stage four, but it does so by instituting 'a system of
"compositions", substituting money damages for talionic vengeance'. 28 So described,
however, the early state seems to have instituted a system of civil rather than criminal law, as there is no suggestion that condemnation or punishment attached to
the 'money damages' the early state apparently imposed. In this respect, again, the
Rousseauvean account provides a useful supplement to the self-help model. On that
26
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account, those charged with enforcing the law will have the authority to express the
public's condemnation oflawbreakers and to punish them for their crimes.
There is reason, then, to regard the Rousseauvean sketch as a plausible account of
the gradual emergence of criminal law, and law in general, at least in broad outline.
But what of the second reason for taking Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality as a
model? That is, what does this approach reveal about the potential of criminal law?
In brief, the 'how it must have been' account indicates that criminal law has the
potential to protect interests, both private and public, and to promote autonomy.
Insofar as criminal law works to secure people against the wrongdoing of others, it
protects their interest in health, safety, and property, among other things. In doing
so, moreover, it promotes their autonomy, both in the sense of their freedom to go
about their business and in the stronger sense of self-government. Criminal law
requires a sense ofpublicity-that is, of being part of a body politic under the rule of
law. Criminal law proscribes and punishes certain acts and activities that it somehow identifies as public wrongs. But the 'it' that identifies, proscribes, and punishes
these wrongs is not criminal law itself, but the public, or some person or persons
acting in the name of the public. To be sure, monarchs, dictators, and functionaries sometimes talk as if their word is law, but in doing so, as I indicated earlier,
they are trespassing on the presumption that law is a public rule of conduct-an
'order of reason', to recur to Aquinas's definition, for the common good enacted by
those in authority and promulgated. Criminal law is a public responsibility, in other
words, that presents an opportunity for members of the public to participate in selfgovernment by helping to give definition and force to the law-an opportunity that
republicans would have us seize and preserve.
Rousseau's Social Contract (1762) is apposite here, especially as it appears to
present a picture of the 'passage from the state of nature to the civil state' very different from the one he set out seven years earlier in the Discourse on Inequality. This
passage, he now says:
produces a most remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they previously lacked. Only when the voice of duty
succeeds physical impulse and right succeeds appetite does man, who had until then considered only himself, find himself compelled to act on different principles and to consult his
reason before listening to his inclinations. Although in this state he denies himself several
of the advantages he owes to nature, he gains others so great-his faculties are exercised and
developed, his ideas are extended, his feelings are ennobled, his whole soul is so upliftedthat if the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him beneath the condition
from which he emerged, he would constantly have to bless the happy moment that tore him
away from it forever, and made a stupid and shortsighted animal into an intelligent being
andaman.29
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In the course of this remarkable transformation, people give up the 'natural liberty'
of the state of nature, 'which is limited only by the strength of the individual', in
order to enjoy 'civil liberty'-freedom under law-and 'moral liberty, which alone
makes man his own master, for impulsion by appetite alone is slavery, and obedience
to the law that one has prescribed for oneself is liberty'.30
'Moral liberty' is thus the kind of self-government that is possible in the civil
state, under the rule of law, but not in the state of nature. There is clearly much
to be said for Rousseau's position here, taking 'moral liberty' to be equivalent to
'autonomy' and recognizing that an autonomous person must be self-governing
rather than simply at liberty to do as he or she pleases. There is also an obvious problem, however. For how is one to obey 'the law that one has prescribed for oneself'
while living under laws that others also have had a voice in making? This, indeed,
is the problem that Rousseau sets himself in the Social Contract: 'To find a form of
association that defends and protects the person and possessions of each associate
with all the common strength, and by means of which each person, joining forces
with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.' 31 Whether
Rousseau's solution to the problem is satisfactory, or even coherent, is a question
we need not take up here. What is clear is that his. and any plausible response to
the problem he sets must rest on an understanding of freedom as 'moral liberty',
autonomy, or the freedom of self-governing citizens who have a voice in the making of the laws under which they live. It must rest, that is, on a broadly republican
understanding of politics and law.
There is also a second problem to consider here, however, and it is one to which
Rousseau pointed in the Discourse on Inequality. This problem is that potential is
not always realized. That means, in this case, that we cannot simply take for granted
that the gradual emergence oflaw according to the 'how it must have been' account
has led, or necessarily leads, to a just or republican society in which everyone enjoys
civil and moral liberty. According to Rousseau's analysis, the social contract that
established the civil state was a bad bargain for all but the rich and powerful, who
persuaded the poor and weak to surrender their natural liberty in order to replace
the 'right' of the strongest with known and settled laws-laws that have been settled
by agents of the rich and powerful. 'Such was, or must have been, the origin of society
and laws', Rousseau declares, 'which gave new fetters to the weak and new powers to
the rich, irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, established forever the law of property and inequality, made clever usurpation into an irrevocable right, and, for the
benefit of a few ambitious individuals, henceforth subjected the whole human race
to labor, servitude, and misery'. 32 In this respect, the Rousseauvean account clearly
has something in common with the interpretation of the self-help model that links
30
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the emergence of the state to the entrepreneurial efforts of a few to take control of
what had been a private system of vengeance and vendetta.
What Rousseau presents, then, is a contrast between law's potential and its perversion. Law is the public's business, and life under the rule oflaw promises freedom from
domination-the freedom to be a self-governing member of a self-governing citizenry.
That is the law as it ought to be, however, and too often the law as it is, through manipulation by the powerful and ideological distortion, falls far short of what it ought to be.
In the case of criminal law, this means that the definition and interpretation of what
counts as a crime, and the enforcement of the law's proscriptions, may be largely in
the hands of some dominant individuals or groups. It also means that social conditions may make it extremely difficult for many people to live within the law. Crime
entails liability to punishment on virtually all definitions of'crime', but the justice of
punishing those who seem driven by circumstances to break the law is hardly obvious.
'The justice of the punishment depends', as the British Idealist TH Green observed,
' ... not merely on ... maintaining this or that particular right which the crime punished violates, but on the question whether the social organization in which a criminal
has lived and acted is one that has given him afair chance of not being a criminal'.33
The question for a republican theory of criminal law, then, is whether it can point
the way toward fulfilment of the law's potential and away from its perversion. To that
question I now turn.

4 CRIMINAL LAW AS A
REPUBLICAN PRACTICE
The foregoing pages have demonstrated, I hope, that there is a connection between
criminal law and the republican concern for publicity. They have also established
that a republican 'how it must have been' explanation of the criminal law's emergence provides a plausible reconstruction of the historical foundations of criminal
law. But what of the philosophical foundations of criminal law? How adequate is this
republican account in this respect?
33
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To answer this question, it may help to turn to an eminent philosopher of law
who is far more likely to be considered a liberal than a republican. That philosopher
is HLA Hart, and he is relevant here because of his depiction of the rule oflaw as a
cooperative practice-in his terms, 'a joint enterprise according to rules'. 34 In The
Concept of Law, Hart gives the following account of law as a practice that is both
cooperative and coercive:
The facts that make rules respecting persons, property, and promises necessary in social
life are simple and their mutual benefits are obvious. Most men are capable of seeing them
and of sacrificing the immediate short-term interests which conformity to such rules
demands ... On the other hand, neither understanding of long-term interests, nor the
strength or goodness of will, upon which the efficacy of these different motives towards
obedience depends, are shared by all men alike. All are tempted at times to prefer their own
immediate interests and, in the absence of a special organization for their detection and
punishment, many would succumb to the temptation ... [E]xcept in very small closely-knit
societies, submission to the system of restraints would be folly if there were no organization for the coercion of those who would then try to obtain the advantages of the system
without submitting to its obligations. 'Sanctions' are therefore required not as the normal
motive for obedience, but as a guarantee that those who would voluntarily obey shall not be
sacrificed to those who would not. To obey, without this, would be to risk going to the wall.
Given this standing danger, what reason demands is voluntary co-operation in a coercive
sytem.35

What Hart calls 'a special organization for [the] detection and punishment'
of those who break the rules that protect 'persons, property, and promises' is
usually called the state or government; or, if the emphasis is on the word 'special', some branch(es) of the state or government. Those terms will suffice, but
republicans will prefer, for reasons to appear shortly, to call the (comprehensive)
entity the polity, commonwealth, or, of course, republic. For now, however, the
important point is to understand how a system of laws is a cooperative practice
or enterprise.
To say that a legal system is a cooperative practice is to point out, first, that no system oflaws can rely entirely on coercion. It is doubtful that even the most thoroughgoing dictatorship, in which the dictator's every wish is an enforced command, can
rest entirely on coercion. Anyone who thinks that laws cannot be reduced to the
commands of the powerful will have all the more reason to believe that a system of
laws must depend upon the general cooperation of those to whom the laws apply.
For these people, as Hart argues, the law will have the internal aspect characteristic
of social rules, so that 'some at least must look upon the behaviour in question as a
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general standard to be followed by the group as a whole'. 36 In the case of a system
oflaws, the 'behaviour in question' will consist in taking the laws as rules by which
members of the group must guide their conduct-that is, obey the law. By doing
so, the members of the group may enjoy the benefits of the rule of law, benefits that
would be unavailable to them if there were not sufficient cooperation in the form of
obedience to the law.
Obeying the law is sometimes burdensome, however, which points to the second
respect in which a legal system is a cooperative practice. Cooperation often entails
restraint or sacrifice, and the temptation to avoid doing one's cooperative part is
sometimes quite strong-for some people, it seems, frequently so. The temptation
is especially strong when one recognizes that it is possible to be a free rider, thereby
enjoying the benefits of others' cooperation without bearing one's full share of the
burdens of the cooperative practice. Coercion and the threat of coercion are thus
necessary, as Hart says, to ensure that 'those who would voluntarily obey will not be
sacrificed to those who would not'.37 In some circumstances, such as the small and
close-knit societies Hart mentions, the sense of solidarity will be powerful enough
to make the threat of sanctions for non-cooperation almost unnecessary. But those
circumstances are rare, and probably growing rarer; and even when they do obtain,
the threat of coercion must still be present.
These points should be familiar enough to require no further elaboration here.
There is a sense, however, in which the rule oflaw is a distinctive kind of cooperative
practice, and something does need to be said in that regard. To put it succinctly, a
system of laws is a super- or meta-cooperative practice.38 In other words, the legal
order is not only a cooperative practice; it is a cooperative practice that enables people to engage in other cooperative practices. The members of a car pool, for example,
are engaged in a cooperative practice that provides them with benefits that they produce for themselves by taking in turns the burdens of picking up and driving those
who are sharing the ride. But in order to produce these benefits for themselves, they
must also be able to take advantage of benefits provided by the legal order, such as the
traffic laws that make it possible for them to drive in relative safety to the workplace,
school, play group, or other destination. Unless they live in a libertarian utopia,
wherein every inch of their journey takes place on privately owned roads governed
by the owners' regulations, they must rely indirectly on the law as a meta-practice if
their car pool is to be the joint venture for mutual benefit that they want it to be.
A further implication of this way of thinking about a system of laws is that such
a system is necessarily political. As a meta-practice, the legal system must establish
laws that make it possible for people to engage in other cooperative practices and to
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go about their individual lives. Laws by themselves are not sufficient, however. The
members of the car pool need not only traffic laws but traffic signals and roads on
which to drive, and these require the collection and expenditure of funds. They also
require that decisions be made as to where roads are to be built, what kind of roads
they should be, and where the signals should be placed, among other things. What is
necessary, in short, is a political order operating under the rule oflaw.
In a political order of this kind, the political order itself will be a cooperative
practice-or, more properly, a meta-cooperative practice. The laws in such an order
will be the terms of fair cooperation, or of what the members take to be the terms of
fair cooperation. Laws will thus need to be promulgated, and cooperation will need
to be encouraged, but the laws themselves will become matters of debate and the
products of public decisions. 'What laws do we need?' thus becomes a vital question,
as do the related questions of who should make these laws, who should enforce them,
and who should apply and interpret them. There is also, finally, the question of how
to hold those who make, enforce, and apply the laws accountable to the public-that
is, to those who have not only duties but rights as members of the cooperative metapractice that is the political order.
Conceiving of the legal order as a cooperative practice, in Hartian fashion, thus
has a number of significant implications. One is that the legal order is also a political order, with the further implication that the philosophy of law-including the
philosophy of criminal law-is entangled with political philosophy. Other things
being equal, those who commit crimes threaten the rule oflaw, and it is necessary to
find ways to prevent them from doing anything more than merely posing a threat,
and then to punish them on those occasions when the preventive efforts fail. What
kinds of actions really do threaten the meta-practice, and should therefore count as
crimes, are not always obvious, however. Robbery, rape, murder, and other standard
examples of crime clearly threaten the meta-practice, as we can hardly expect people
to think and act as participants in a cooperative enterprise when they believe themselves to be in constant jeopardy from those who are supposedly fellow members of
the polity. So do offenses that directly threaten the rule oflaw itself, such as suborning witnesses and other forms of obstruction of justice. But what of flag burning,
say, or drug use? Or what of so-called Bad Samaritan laws, according to which those
who fail to intervene in or even report a criminal act when they could do so safely are
themselves guilty of a crime? 39 Decisions that affect the members of the polity will
have to be taken in these and many other cases, which is to say that the definition of
crime must in this way be a public or political matter.
Yet another implication of conceiving of the legal cum political order as a cooperative practice is that the connection to republicanism becomes more evident. So
conceived, the need for what Hart calls a 'special organization for [the] detection
39

See, eg, J Dressler, 'Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) about "Bad Samaritan" Laws' (2000)

40 Santa Clara Law Review 971-89.

REPUBLICANISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW

63

and punishment' of those who would not respect 'persons, property, and promises'
is clear. Such an organization, as I said earlier, is usually called a (branch of the)
'state' or 'government'. To the extent that these terms imply that faceless, nameless
functionaries are the ones who make, enforce, and apply the laws, however, these
terms are less satisfactory than terms such as 'polity', 'commonwealth', or 'republic'.
The latter all convey that the law is a matter of public concern-a crucial part of the
public's business. Such must be the case if the legal cum political order is a metapractice, for then the terms of fair cooperation will be of vital importance to the government of their lives. That means both the ability to govern their individual lives,
free from interference when possible, and the ability to govern their lives collectively
through the making oflaws, whether directly or indirectly by the election oflegislators. Conceived as a meta-cooperative practice, in short, the rule oflaw implies the
two leading features of republicanism-that is, publicity and self-government. That
is the republican potential implicit in the law, at any rate, even if that potential is far
from realized in actual systems oflaw, criminal and otherwise.
A final implication is that the conception of the legal cum political order as a
cooperative practice helps to clarify the communicative aspect of the criminal law.
According to some philosophers, legal punishment is, among other things, an attempt
to communicate to those who break the law the wrongness of their actions, with
the aim of bringing them into the fold or restoring them to the community whose
standards they have violated. In Punishment, Communication, and Community, for
example, Antony Duff develops a 'communicative theory' of punishment, 'according to which punishment should be understood as a species of secular penance that
aims not just to copimunicate censure but thereby to persuade offenders to repentance, self-reform, and reconciliation'.40 Similarly, Herbert Morris's paternalistic
theory of punishment 'relies essentially on the idea of punishment as a complex
communicative act .. .'; moreover, Morris takes a 'communicative component' to be
'a defining characteristic of punishment' that 'in part distinguishes it from mere
retaliation or acting out of revenge ... '.41 But what, we may ask, gives some of us the
right or authority to communicate our standards in this way? We may grant that
punishment oflawbreakers is a way of communicating the society's, community's,
or polity's displeasure with them, but punishment is typically an especially harsh
and unpleasant form of communication. As such, it requires more of a justification
than, say, a remonstrance or mere expression of disapproval does. Such a justification may be found, however, in the offender's violation of the laws comprising the
meta-practice that, ceteris paribus, supplies him or her with benefits through the
cooperative restraint of others. As part of that practice, we give some ofour members
40
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the authority to detect and punish those who do not respect the 'persons, property,
and promises' of the other members of the practice-that is, the other members of
the polity, commonwealth, or republic. Insofar as the offender enjoys the benefits
of the meta-cooperative practice without fully contributing to their provision by
bearing his or her share of the burdens of obeying the law, then the offender in effect
justifies the rest of us in punishing him or her. In Rousseau's terms, the offender
wants to 'enjoy the rights of a citizen without wanting to fulfill the duties of a subject,
an injustice that would bring about the ruin of the body politic, were it to spread'.42
That is why the polity is justified in communicating its censure to the offender by
means of punishment. How severely to punish, or whether a mere remonstrance will
be sufficient, is a judgment that will have to vary with the severity of the crime and
other circumstances; but the authority to punish rests on the polity's commitment
to the meta-practice oflaw.
For these reasons, I believe that republicanism supplies a plausible philosophical
as well as historical reconstruction of the foundations of criminal law. The account
sketched above is too brief to be fully satisfactory, of course, and some parts of it are
surely controversial. The justification of punishment that follows from conceiving of
the legal cum political order, for example, is the oft-criticized reciprocity or fair-play
theory. Whether the critics are right, though, remains a matter of dispute.43 In any
case, I believe that it should now be clear that republicanism provides the materials
for a coherent philosophical account of the foundations of criminal law with considerable appeal. That this account draws heavily on HLA Hart's conception oflaw as a
cooperative practice suggests that republicanism is capable ofattracting wide support.
Two worries remain, however, and I now turn to them in concluding this chapter.

5 CONCLUSION
These two worries stem from the suspicion that republicanism may not be an altogether benign approach to either politics or law. When it is taken to provide the
underpinnings for criminal law, there is therefore cause for concern that the power
of the law will be employed in ways that are inimical to individual liberty and rights.
In particular, there is the worry that taking criminal law to be the public's business
will lead to some kind of majoritarianism or populism that will declare unpopular
42
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acts and practices to be criminal; and even if the majority is held in check, there
is the further worry that republican regimes will impose the pursuit of virtue on
people who simply want to go about their lives without harming or being harmed
by others.
In the space remaining, I cannot hope to set out a fully adequate response to these
worries. I can, however, indicate how such a response would proceed. With regard to
the first worry, the response is simply the denial that republicans are committed to
any kind of straightforward majoritarianism or populism. Indeed, one of the complaints against republicans is that their tendency to exalt the virtues of the armsbearing, property-owning citizen has led them to be insufficiently appreciative of
democracy and of the importance of women to public life. Contemporary republicans have taken pains to meet this objection, but in doing so they have also made it
plain that the neo-republican commitment to democracy is not a commitment to the
unchecked, unqualified rule of the majority. Not only do constitutionalism, mixed
government, and separation of powers remain as important to neo-republicans as to
their forebears; they are now supplemented by attempts to devise 'contestatory' and
deliberative forms of democracy.44 Republicans do believe that crime is very much
a part of the public's business, to be sure, but they do not hold that crime is simply
whatever the majority declares it to be. To take such a position would be to surrender
the republican commitment to self-government.
That leaves us, though, with the second worry. Republicans place considerable
emphasis on virtue, it may be said, and the desire to cultivate virtue among the
citizenry could easily lead to the abuse of the criminal law. Although he does not
expressly refer to republicanism in this regard, Jeffrie Murphy's concerns about
attempts to use the law, and punishment in particular, to promote virtue are surely
apposite. In brief, his concern is that such attempts are illiberal, with liberalism
understood to be an ideology that is 'basically fearful of government (because of its
potential to impose a uniform vision of the good life) and tolerates government only
as a kind of umpire, an agency to make sure th_e basic ground rules that preserve individual moral autonomy-such as the rules of toleration-are observed'.45 Taking
liberalism thus understood as his baseline, Murphy then goes on to say:
It is hard indeed to see how any very strong or interesting program of coercive state moral

education and improvement is consistent with this outlook-whether carried out explicitly

44
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in the public schools or in some indirect and symbolic way via criminal punishment. To see
such programs as representing a compelling state interest is, I think, simply to abandon the
liberal theory of the state.46

What is there to say in response to this worry? Those who see a sharp distinction
between republicanism and liberalism might well grasp the nettle here and accept
that abandoning liberalism is the price to pay for using schools and criminal punishment to promote virtue-a price well worth paying, in their view. For those who
deny, as I do, that republicanism and liberalism either can or should be sharply distinguished from each other, a more conciliatory response is appropriate. The key
point here is that the kind of virtue that republicans want to promote-the kind that
they fear too many liberals have taken for granted-is civic virtue.47 Republicans
do want to make people better, in other words, but they want to make them better
citizens; and this means, among other things, that they want people to be better
observers of'the rules of toleration' and the other liberal 'ground rules' that Murphy
takes to be necessary to the preservation of 'individual moral autonomy'. They also
want to foster the conditions under which men and women will be citizens who are
willing to do their part in maintaining the cooperative practice that is the rule of
law-and who can thus set aside the temptation to violate the person, province, and
property of others.48
These worries, then, should not deflect us from the project ofdeveloping the republican theory of criminal law. Such a theory will take criminal law to be a cooperative,
communicative practice that is itself part of the meta-practice of the polity. As such,
it will be necessary to determine what activities threaten the existence of the practice
as a whole and the interests of its cooperating members, what steps are necessary to
prevent these activities, and what measures are to be imposed on those who nevertheless engage in them. In other words, what activities are to count as crimes, how
are crimes to be prevented, and how are criminals to be punished? The answers to
these questions will for the most part be the standard answers-rape, murder, robbery, and assault must be crimes, for example-and in other cases the answers will
vary with the circumstances of the polity. At the most general level, however, the
answer will always be the response to this question: what kinds of activities should
we proscribe as threats to our republic, should we be fortunate enough to inhabit
one, and to ourselves as self-governing citizens?
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